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Abstract 
 
In this paper we study the relationship between airport efficiency and two factors: an 
airport’s centrality in the EU network, and the intensity of competition from alternative 
airports in the same catchment area. We apply a two-stage econometric model based on the 
Simar & Wilson (2007) bootstrap procedure to a balanced sample of 57 European airports. 
We also design and compute our own measures of airport centrality and competition. The 
results show that efficiency is positively related to centrality in the European network, as 
measured by a weighted sum of minimal paths passing through the airport in question. The 
intensity of competition between airports also has a positive effect on efficiency. Our 
analysis suggests that air transportation policies should focus on increasing competition 
within important catchment areas (e.g., by investing in infrastructure facilitating access to 
alternative airports) and enhancing the connectivity of the EU network (e.g., by subsidizing 
new point-to-point connections between airports with capacity to spare). 
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1. Introduction 
 
The liberalization of air transport in the European Union (EU) was completed in 1997.1 
Since then the EU network has expanded as never before, contributing to the economic growth of 
the sector. Airlines are providing an increasing number of routes, even in remote areas, and 
moving more and more passengers.2 The airports are key factors in this expansion, insofar as they 
provide benefits to passenger and freight mobility. Airports also spur the development of local 
economies by acting as gateways to other regions, or connecting nodes of the network. 
The benefits produced by airports are proportional to their efficiency. More intense 
capacity utilization is usually achieved by moving greater numbers of aircrafts and passengers, 
while this traffic is in turn linked to the airport’s relative importance in the EU network. 
Moreover, more efficient airports should be able to offer airlines lower fees, yielding (if these 
savings are transferred to tickets) benefits for consumers and firms.3 The latter scenario is more 
likely in airports facing a higher degree of competition.  
Despite the intuitive importance of the airport’s position in the EU network and the 
intensity of (local) competition among airports, as yet there is no empirical evidence supporting 
the idea that these factors have an effect on airport efficiency. This paper attempts to bridge the 
gap by building a two-stage econometric model relating network position, the degree of 
competition, and airport efficiency. The model is applied to a dataset of 57 European airports, 
including all those with more than 10 million passengers per year, and 90% of those with 5-10 
million passengers per year.  
Furthermore, the paper develops some proxies for computing the centrality of airports in 
the network and the intensity of competition coming from other airports in the same catchment 
                                                 
1
 The EU liberalization process was composed of three packages, introduced in 1987, 1990 and 1993 respectively. 
The “eighth freedom” of cabotage (the right for an airline of one EU Member State to operate a route within another 
EU Member State) was approved in 1997. This single market was extended to Norway, Iceland and Balkan countries 
in subsequent years. A strong and very liberal aviation agreement is in force with Switzerland. All the relevant 
legislation can be found at the website http://ec.europa.eu/transport/air_portal/internal_market/competition_en.htm. 
Recently the EU and the US have signed an Open Skies agreement, which should further improve the sector (see 
details at http://ec.europa.eu/transport/air_portal/international/pillars/global_partners/us_en.htm). 
2
 The number of passengers has increased from 2003 to 2007 at an average annual rate of 6.15% (CAGR). If we 
include the beginning of the decade, and hence the consequences of the September 11th 2001 terrorist attack on the 
air transport industry, this rate is slightly lower (4,36%) (see Malighetti et al., 2008a). However, the growth is still 
bigger than the average annual increase (2001-2007) of 2% in real GDP for the 15 EU nations (Eurostat). The 
number of routes has increased by more than 60% since 1997 (European Commission, Regulation No 1008/2008). 
3
 This effect should be reinforced by EC Regulation No. 1008/2008, which came into force on November 1st 2008. 
This law requires airlines to include all taxes and charges in their published ticket prices, and to itemize tariffs, taxes 
and airport charges. Hence, airline costumers will soon be able to compare the real prices charged by the various 
European airports, a change which can only increase their competitive pressure. 
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area. The importance of an airport within the network and the extent to which an airport is crucial 
to reach some destinations are linked concepts, both closely related to the idea of centrality. A 
higher centrality should be associated with a greater number of passengers (due to transfer 
flights) and therefore more intense utilization of the inputs dedicated to passengers: the terminal 
area, the number of check-in desks, etc. Moreover, the fact that more flights pass through the 
airport should have a second-order positive effect on aircraft movements.4 Hence, our first 
research hypothesis is that airport centrality has a positive impact on efficiency.  
Intense development of the air transportation network has created a significant degree of 
competition between certain groups of nearby airports. Furthermore, the entrance of new airlines 
has allowed travellers to choose both origin and destination airports along certain routes. 
Economic theory suggests that more competition should lead to more efficiency. Consequently, 
our second research hypothesis is that a higher degree of airport competition has a positive 
impact on efficiency. 
The airports’ technical efficiency is investigated using a two-stage bootstrap procedure, 
following the methodology of Simar & Wilson (2007). In the first stage, Data Envelopment 
Analysis (DEA) is employed to obtain consistent but biased estimates of the airports’ efficiency 
scores (Banker et al., 1984; Charnes et al., 1978). In the second stage, the Simar & Wilson 
procedure performs a truncated regression on the DEA scores to obtain unbiased estimates of the 
efficiency scores and identify their determinants. This procedure avoids inference problems 
concerning the statistical significance of the second-stage covariates.5  
Our main findings are as follows. First, an airport’s centrality in the EU network has a 
positive impact on its efficiency, especially if we consider the airport’s capacity for moving 
passengers. Hence, we have identified an empirical relationship between efficient input 
utilization and the quality of being a “key” airport for passenger mobility within European 
countries. We also find a weaker effect on aircraft movements. A possible explanation for this 
difference is that airlines respond to an increase in passenger traffic at a given airport first by 
choosing higher capacity airplanes, avoiding the necessity of increasing the number of aircraft.  
Second, airport efficiency is greater where the intensity of competition coming from nearby 
                                                 
4
 The effect of airport centrality on aircraft movements also depends on the types of aircrafts employed. For example, 
higher centrality airports may attract larger aircraft, a change which does not necessarily imply more movement. 
Nonetheless, the overall effect of centrality should still be positive. 
5
 The standard two-stage regression adopted in several papers on airport technical efficiency (e.g. Abbott & Wu, 
2002; Barros & Dieke, 2007; Gillen & Lall, 1997) yields inference problems for several reasons. See Section 3 for a 
detailed explanation. 
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airports is higher. This result has two important policy implications: (1) the welfare of consumers 
will be enhanced by policies that increase the indirect competition faced by airports (e.g., 
investing in roads and railways that reduce the time required to reach alternative nearby airports, 
or increasing the number of slots available in nearby airports); and (2) the need for airport 
regulation (e.g., of airport charges) is inversely related to the intensity of indirect competition.6 
Third, we find evidence for a scale effect related to managing multiple airports. That is, 
when two (or more) airports are controlled by the same executive board, we find a positive effect 
on their efficiency in dealing with passengers. This may be explained by economies of scale or 
learning effects.7  
Fourth, we find no evidence that the presence of a dominant airline in an airport has a 
positive effect on its efficiency. A possible explanation for this result is the growing importance 
of point-to-point connections within the European network.  
Our last result is that European airports are more efficient in dealing with passengers than 
they are with aircraft movements. When we consider aircraft, only 19% of European airports lie 
on the efficient frontier (see Section 2), this percentage increases to 33% when we look at 
passengers. In more detail, we find that the largest (category A) airports tend to be more efficient 
than the national (category B) ones.8 These results mainly imply that large European airports are 
operating at full capacity while the national airports have spare capacity. 
 
Related works. Several authors have already investigated various aspects of airport 
efficiency. Gillen & Lall (1997) analyze a sample of 21 US airports (all among of the 30 largest 
US airports), and show that the presence of a hub airline and the number of gates both increase 
the efficiency of aircraft movements. Other studies on the efficiency of US airports are provided 
by Oum & Yu (2004), Sarkis (2000), and Sarkis & Talluri (2004).9 Pels et al. (2001, 2003) 
                                                 
6
 Clearly, a higher index of indirect competition between airports does not guarantee effective competition. The  
managing bodies of airports may be involved in tacit collusion to fix prices (in this case airport charges). However, 
under these circumstances antitrust authorities should limit the possibility of collusion. 
7
 The learning effect inherent in managing more than one airport is mainly linked to the value of dealing with 
different airlines. 
8
 According to the European Commission, airports can be divided into four dimensional classes: Great European 
Airports (those with more than 10 million passengers per year), National Airports (those with fewer than 10 million 
and more than 5 million passengers per year), Great Regional Airports (with fewer than 5 million but more than 1 
million passengers), and Small Regional Airports (with fewer than 1 million passengers). 
9
 Sarkis (2000) finds evidence for a size effect on efficiency, since major hubs are more efficient than airports on the 
spokes. Sarkis & Talluri (2004) perform a benchmarking analysis based on DEA and clustering over a sample of 44 
US airports. Oum & Yu (2004) compute productivity factors for airports included in the 2003 ATRS (Air Transport 
Research Society) Global Airport Benchmarking Report, which covers 37 US airports, 6 North American airports, 26 
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analyze the efficiency of 34 European airports (from 1995 to 1997) using both parametric and 
non-parametric techniques, and show that several airports are inefficient. Oum et al. (2008) 
investigate the impact of different forms of ownership on the efficiency of 109 airports 
worldwide, and find that those controlled by private firms, autonomous public corporations, or 
independent authorities are more efficient than public airports. 
Other papers analyze airport efficiency within single countries. Parker (1999) investigates 
the impact of privatization on a sample of 22 British airports, finding that the change has no 
impact on efficiency. Yoshida (2004) and Yoshida & Fujimoto (2004) focus on Japanese regional 
airports, which seem to be less efficient than others because they suffer from political pressure.10 
After computing the efficiency scores and Malmquist Indices of Chinese airports, Fung et al. 
(2008) find that size has a positive effect on efficiency. They also show that airport productivity 
in China has grown over the period 1995-2004. The Australian airports have been investigated by 
Hooper & Hensher (1997) and Abbott & Wu (2002), both works showing again that privatization 
has no impact on efficiency. Fernandes & Pacheco (2002) and Pacheco & Fernandes (2003) 
provide a benchmark analysis of the performance of Brazilian airports, focusing on domestic 
airports. Barros & Sampaio (2004) provide benchmarks and determinants of economic efficiency 
for a sample of 10 Portuguese airports, arguing that Portuguese airports should be privatized. 
Martin & Roman (2001), Martin Cejas (2002) and Murillo Melchor (1999) have all evaluated the 
efficiency of Spanish airports.11 Barros & Dieke (2007, 2008) have published two papers on the 
efficiency of Italian airports. In the first they analyze 31 airports over a period of 3 years (2001-
2003), using balance sheet data to obtain information about certain inputs (labor costs, invested 
capital, and operational costs). In the second paper they adopt the Simar & Wilson (2007) 
methodology to perform a second-stage analysis using the same dataset, i.e., they identify the 
determinants of efficiency. In particular, they show that larger airports and private airports tend to 
be more efficient than others. Malighetti et al. (2007) also investigate the Italian sector, building 
a dataset of 34 airports over the period 2005-2006. They collect their physical inputs directly 
from the airports, rather than working with balance sheet data, and show that efficiency is higher 
                                                                                                                                                              
European airports, and 21 airports from Asian countries. They show that both airport size and capacity constraints 
(which create costs paid by airlines and passengers) improve airport productivity. 
10
 Regional Japanese airports have more capacity than they need (over capacity) because local politicians direct 
more investment to their region, in order to gain consensus. 
11
 Martin & Roman (2001) show that many Spanish airports are inefficient, Martin Cejas (2002) presents evidence 
that these inefficiencies are related to size, and Murillo Melchor (1999) finds that large airports have decreasing 
returns to scale. 
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if the airport is dominated by a single carrier.  
This research contributes to the literature by analyzing the efficiency of a large (57 airports) 
and balanced (all airports with more than 10 millions passengers are included in the sample, and 
small airports are excluded) dataset of European airports. In both aspects this sample improves on 
that used by Pels et al. (2001, 2003), the most directly comparable study. Outputs and physical 
inputs (runways, terminal surface, etc.) for the airports were collected for the year 2006. The 
sample covers 100% of the largest European airports (of which there are 31) and 90% of those 
classified by the EU Commission as National airports (26 out of 29).12  
 
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes how we compute the importance of 
airports in the European network and the index of indirect competition. In Section 3 we present 
the two-stage Simar & Wilson (2007) econometric model. In Section 4 we describe our dataset 
and present summary statistics on the European airports. Section 5 presents the DEA results, 
while the correlations provided by our econometric model are described in Section 6. Concluding 
comments are found in Section 7. 
 
2. Methodology: airport connectivity index and indirect competition index  
 
This Section describes how to compute several indices of network connectivity and the 
index of competitive pressure. 
 
2.1 The airport connectivity index 
 
In order to assess an airport’s importance to the European network, we begin by 
considering measures of connectivity derived from network theory. More precisely, we apply the 
shortest path length (SPL) approach to obtain a proxy for an airport’s centrality in the European 
network. The SPL between airport A and airport B is defined as the minimum number of steps 
required to connect A and B. For example, if there is a direct link between airport A and airport B, 
then SPLAB = 1. If A and B are not directly linked but both are connected to a third airport C, then 
SPLAB = 2. To describe a network of N airports, a N×N adjacency matrix H is used. An element 
hij is equal to 1 if and only if there is a direct connection between airport i and airport j; otherwise 
it is set to 0. A standard algorithm is employed to calculate the minimum number of steps 
                                                 
12
 The sample does not include the airports of Belfast, Bristol and Nice. 
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between each pair of airports (Bagler, 2004).  
The average SPL of an airport is a proxy for its connectivity, but this measure does not 
quantify the importance of its role as an intermediate node between airports that are not directly 
connected. For this purpose, graph theory has developed an indicator known as betweenness 
centrality (Freeman, 1977; Wasserman & Faust, 1994).  
Following the work of Guimerà et al. (2005), we define the “Betweenness” Bk of airport k 
as the number of minimal paths within the entire network that pass through airport k. The higher 
the value of Bk, the more central the airport and the more important its connecting role. Bk is 
defined formally as follows: 
 
∑ ∑
≠= ≠=
=
N
kii
N
kjj
jikB
,1 ,1
,
φ , 
 
where 1
,
=jiφ  if the shortest connection between airport i and airport j passes through airport k, 
and 0 otherwise.  
Calculation of SPLs at the European level shows that many optimal connections have more 
than one possible path. This is mainly due to the high level of integration associated with the 
most important European airports, which collectively provide several alternative routes between 
minor destinations with SPL ≥ 2. To distinguish those cases where a passenger has no alternative 
but to pass through airport k to reach a specific destination, we introduce a new measure of 
centrality called Essential Betweenness (EB). This is the number of unavoidable minimal paths 
passing through an airport, i.e., the number of minimal paths that are unique solutions for their 
nodes. Figure 1 shows the difference between these two measures of network centrality. In this 
example, airport E can only be reached by passing through airport D. Airports B, C, and D each 
have some degree of Betweenness. However, only airport D has a measure of Essential 
Betweenness.13 
 
[insert Figure 1 here] 
 
                                                 
13
 When analyzing the connection A-E we find two different Shortest Path Lengths (SPL1 and SPL2), each with 3 
steps (A-B-D-E and A-C-D-E). In this case, the A-E connection must be counted when calculating the Betweenness 
of airports B, C, and D. The A-E connection is counted only for airport D, however, when calculating Essential 
Betweenness. 
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 The Essential Betweenness for an airport k is defined as follows: 
 
∑ ∑
≠= ≠=
=
N
kii
N
kjj
jijikEB
,1 ,1
,,
φχ , 
 
where χi,j equals 1 when all the shortest paths between airport i and airport j pass through airport 
k. The indicator variable χi,j equals 0 when one or more of the shortest paths linking airport i and 
airport j does not pass through airport k. It is clear that EBk ≤ Bk. 
 
The aforementioned measures of connectivity and centrality have some shortcomings. One 
is that the optimal connection between airport i and airport j does not take into account flight 
frequency. After all, a connection with only one flight per year cannot be compared on equal 
terms to a daily connection. Second, traditional shortest path approaches neglect routing factors. 
The routing factor of a path between airport i and airport j is defined as the ratio between the sum 
of in-flight distances and the great circle distance. The higher the routing factor, the longer the 
detour passengers have to take to complete the connection. Malighetti et al. (2008) show that 
among the three major airport networks (European, US and Chinese), the average routing factor 
is 1.07 for 2-step quickest connections and 1.11 for 3-step connections. This result means that on 
average, optimal 2-step connections allow for a 7% increase in flight distance with respect to the 
minimum “as the crow flies” distance. An optimal connection with a routing factor of 1.05 
cannot be directly compared to an alternative having a routing factor of 1.4.  
We thus modify the above definitions of Betweenness and Essential Betweenness to take 
into account the effects of flight frequency and routing factors. The adjusted Betweenness index, 
kB
~
 is defined as 
 
∑ ∑
≠= ≠=
⋅
=
N
kii
N
kjj ji
jiji
k
r
f
B
,1 ,1 ,
,,~
φ
, 
 
where fi,j is the minimum flight frequency on the optimal connection passing through airport k. 
For example, given an optimal two-step path i-k-j, fi,j is the lesser of the i-k frequency and the k-j 
frequency. We use the minimum frequency in order to take into account bottleneck flights which 
could undermine the connection’s desirability from a passenger perspective. The routing factor of 
the i-j connection is ri,j. All else being equal, this measure of Betweenness assigns greater 
importance to connections with high frequencies and low routing factors. 
 9 
The Essential Betweenness index is adjusted as follows: 
∑ ∑
≠= ≠=
⋅⋅
=
N
kii
N
kjj ji
jijiji
k
r
f
EB
,1 ,1 ,
,,,
φχ
. 
 
As a proxy for how essential an airport is to reach some destinations, we also compute the ratio 
kkk BEBR
~/= : the weighted percentage of shortest connections passing through airport k which 
have no alternative route of equal length. At Rk = 0, the airport is never essential to reach other 
destinations, even if it has a high Betweenness kB
~
. At Rk = 1, a passenger must always pass 
through airport k when it lies on a shortest path to another destination. In other words, 
Betweenness merely represents an airport’s potential for indirect connectivity. A high value of 
Rk, however, indicates that the airport is a vital connector for some portion of the network.  
The kB
~
 and kEB  indices were calculated using the Innovata database14, which publishes 
information on scheduled flights. For each flight, the following data are available: departure 
airport, departure time, arrival airport, arrival time, frequency, and operating airline. Our analysis 
of SPLs includes all 478 European airports with at least one scheduled passenger flight during 
October 2007.  
Figure 2 plots the centrality indices kB
~
 and kEB  against each other for the 57 European 
airports in our sample. The main hubs are characterized by high Betweenness levels and low 
Essential Betweenness levels. Note that Betweenness represents an airport’s potential for indirect 
connectivity; for instance, Amsterdam Schiphol is a possible intermediate node for more than 
33,000 pairs of European airports, but its Essential Betweenness is only about 1.5%. On the other 
hand, a high level of Essential Betweenness indicates that the airport is vital connector to some 
nodes of the network (i.e., some regions in Europe). The Scandinavian airports (Stockholm 
Arlanda, Helsinki Vantaa, Oslo and Copenhagen) act as gateways to local national airports, and 
thus have the highest values of Essential Betweenness (well over 10%). A similar role is played 
by Athens in Greece, and by Orly in France. London Stansted is both a local gateway and a 
connecting node to many European airports, especially those catering to low-cost carriers.  
 
[insert Figure 2 here] 
 
 
                                                 
14
 Innovata is a provider of Scheduled Reference Services in partnership with IATA. The SRS airline schedules 
database contains data from over 892 airlines worldwide. 
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2.2 The airport indirect competition index 
 
 
Our index of indirect competition for each airport is again based on features of the EU 
network, and is closely related to the airport’s catchment area. In air transportation, each origin-
destination route defines a separate market. Hence, we assume that the airport is subject to some 
“indirect competition” on a specific route if the same connection is available at other nearby 
airports. Naturally, the same standard of closeness should be applied at both origin and 
destination. We consider an alternative airport “close enough” (to generate competition) if its 
geographic distance from the airport under consideration is no more than 100 km. Thus, for a 
given connection between two airports, there may be several “close” alternatives to the departure 
airport (the “origin”) and several “close” alternatives to the arrival airport (the “destination”).  
For instance, consider a generic airline’s connection between the Rome Fiumicino and 
London Heathrow airports. The relevant market is the Rome-London route. Let us now suppose 
that another (or the same) airline provides a connection between Rome Ciampino and London 
Stansted. The Rome Ciampino airport lies less than 100 km away from Rome Fiumicino, and 
London Stansted is less than 100 km from London Heathrow. Both airports are therefore “close” 
with respect to the route under consideration. Hence, the Rome Fiumicino-London Heathrow 
connection is subject to indirect competition from the Rome Ciampino-London Stansted 
connection.  
Let kiw  refer to a connection i available at airport k.  Let 
k
jz  denote a connection j at airport 
k which is also available at an airport “close” to k. The indirect competition index of airport k is 
then defined as 
∑
∑
=
i
k
i
j
k
j
k
w
z
IC : the ratio of the total number of connections available at both 
airport k and “close” airports to the total number of connections at airport k. In computing the 
indirect competition index, we replace w and z with the Available Seat Kilometers (ASK) 
associated with each connection, i.e., the product of offered seats and flight distance. When kIC  
is zero, the airport is not subject to indirect competition from other airports. When the ratio is 
one, all the connections supplied by the airport (and therefore all their ASK) are also offered by 
“close” airports. In the latter case, the airport is under the highest possible “competitive 
pressure”. 
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For each European airport in our sample, we counted the number of “close” airports and 
identified the connections subject to indirect competition. For each airport, we then sum the ASK 
of connections subject to indirect competition. Lastly, we calculate ICk, the percentage of total 
ASK at each airport subject to indirect competition.15  
Figure 3 shows the indirect competition indices for all European airports included in the 
sample. Notice that the major European hubs (e.g. London Heathrow, Paris Charles de Gaulle, 
Frankfurt and Amsterdam Schiphol) are subject to very low levels of indirect competition, or 
even a complete absence of indirect competition in the case of Madrid Barajas. The highest levels 
of indirect competition are observed in airports belonging to the Milan catchment area in Italy 
(Milan Linate and Bergamo Orio al Serio) and the London area (London Stansted and London 
Luton).  
 
[insert Figure 3 here] 
 
 
3. The two-stage Simar & Wilson econometric model 
 
Our main purpose in this section is to estimate the effects of the connectivity and indirect 
competition indices on airport efficiency. We adopt a two-stage econometric model: in the first 
stage we obtain efficiency scores for each airport in the sample using Data Envelopment Analysis 
(DEA), and in the second stage we follow the approach proposed by Simar & Wilson (2007) to 
estimate the effect of some covariates on the efficiency scores. 
The DEA approach, which assumes that all airports have access to the same technology, 
transforms a vector x  of L inputs into a vector y of M outputs. The DEA model, through a 
sequence of linear programming methods, creates a piecewise linear “frontier” encompassing the 
data.16 There are two varieties of DEA analysis to choose from: a Constant Return to Scale (CRS) 
model (Cooper et al., 1978) and a Variable Return to Scale (VRS) model (Banker et al., 1984). 
The two models are used to distinguish between Technical Efficiency (TE) and Scale Efficiency 
                                                 
15
 We acknowledge that this definition presents some drawbacks. For instance, simple distance is always a good 
proxy for the travelling time, which would be the optimal driver for this analysis. However, we believe that in the 
absence of information on travelling times, the simple distance may be considered a good approximation of the 
origin and destination airports’ accessibility.  
16
 Under this approach, the efficiency of an airport is estimated relative to the performance of other airports. 
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(SE) respectively.17  
Using Farrell’s (1957) input-oriented measure of technical efficiency,18 the efficiency score 
iδ  of airport i is defined as follows: 
 
{ }Pyx
iii
∈= ),(:min θθδ
θ
, 
 
where P is the technology set, i.e., { ),( yxP = : x can produce }y . iδ  measures the Euclidean 
distance from the point ),(
ii
yx  to the boundary P, along a direction orthogonal to the output 
axes and parallel to the input axes ( 10 ≤≤ iδ , where an airport is efficient if 1=iδ ). The 
assumption is that some airports are positioned on the frontier of efficiency allowed by available 
technology; those located on the frontier are “efficient”, while all others are “inefficient”. Since P 
is unobserved we can use the estimator 
iii
yx ,(ˆδ | )P  as written. If the CRS model is adopted, it 
will be expressed in terms of the linear program 
 
{ }+∈≥≤>= niii RqqXxqYy ,,|0minˆ θθδ ; 
 
if the VRS model is adopted, we instead use the linear program 
 
{ }+∈=′≥≤>= niii RqqsqXxqYy ,1,,|0minˆ θθδ .              (1) 
 
In either case Y = [
n
yyy ,,,
21
K ] (n being the number of airports in the sample), 
i
y is a vector of 
                                                 
17
 See Charnes et al. (1978), Coelli (1996), and Färe et al. (1994) for a discussion of the DEA model. The choice 
between CRS and VRS usually depends on the context and purpose of the analysis (managerial benchmarking would 
use VRS, while a long-run analysis would use CRS), on the length of the time interval covered by the data (VRS is 
more appropriate for short intervals), and on the relevance of external factors (e.g. regulation, time limits to the hours 
of operation, weather conditions) which might limit the airport’s ability to operate at the optimal scale. See Barros & 
Sampaio (2004) and Pels et al. (2003) for a more thorough analysis of the latter point. The size of the available 
sample may also be relevant to the choice between CRS and VRS. In small samples there are few large units, so the 
VRS model would tend to find them all efficient for want of meaningful comparison. Our sample is rather 
homogenous (only the large European airports are considered) and covers a short period, so the VRS model seems 
more appropriate. 
18 We choose an input-oriented DEA model, since we assume that decisions concerning the output levels are beyond 
the control of airport managements (Gillen & Lall, 1997; Pels et al., 2003). 
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outputs for airport i,   X = [ nxxx ,,, 21 K ], ix is a vector of inputs for airport i, q = [q1, q2, … , qn] 
is a vector of intensity variables, and s  a column vector of 1’s. The parameters ),( qθ  are 
solutions of the problem.19  
 
 
As shown by Kneip et al. (1998), iδˆ  is a consistent estimator of iδ . It has a low rate of 
convergence, however, and is biased downward (by construction).20 Hence, a bootstrap procedure 
appears to offer the only way to approximate the asymptotic distribution of iδˆ  in a multivariate 
setting (Simar & Wilson, p. 38). This approach will be useful in the second stage, where we want 
to estimate the following regression model (i = 1, 2, …, n): 
 
1≤++= iii Za εβδ , 
 
where a is a constant term, Zi is a row vector of observation-specific environmental variables that 
may affect the relationship between inputs and outputs, β  is a column vector of free parameters, 
and iε  is a continuous iid random variable. The above relation is estimated using a censored 
Tobit regression. In the past, it was common to carry the first-stage estimates iδˆ  over to the 
second stage as a proxy for the unobserved distances iδ . Simar & Wilson showed that this 
approach has inference problems.21 Furthermore, the bias term in the first-stage DEA estimate 
has a nonzero mean. Fortunately, the bias term may be estimated by bootstrap methods (Simar & 
Wilson, p. 39). The bootstrap bias estimate is equal to the true bias plus a residual term whose 
                                                 
19 It is important to remember that the environment where we applied the DEA model has to be homogeneous. In 
Europe the regulations are not uniform across airports, so the costs of several inputs (labor, electricity, fuel, etc.) 
should vary as well. However, these differences are not so large as to prevent application of the DEA approach to the 
airport sector, as shown by many past contributions to the literature (e.g. Pels et al., 2003). 
20
 The rate of convergence is defined by the relation )(ˆ )1/(2 ++−+= MLLii nϕδδ , where L is the number of inputs 
and M is the number of outputs. The rate slows as L + M increases, the well-known curse of dimensionality. 
21
 The iδˆ  are serially correlated in a complicated and unknown way, since they depend on all observations ( ii yx , ) 
in the dataset (through P). Consequently, the error term iε  is also serially correlated. Moreover, ix and iy  are 
correlated with zi (otherwise the second-stage regression is meaningless) so the zi are correlated with iε . This means 
that maximum likelihood estimates of β  will be consistent, but will not have the usual parametric rate of 2/1−n . For 
L + M > 3, correlation among the errors does not disappear quickly enough for standard inference approaches. 
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variance diminishes as ∞→n . It can therefore be used to construct a corrected estimator of iδ . 
Maximum likelihood estimation using the bias-corrected distance function estimators yields 
consistent and efficient results, as shown by Simar & Wilson in Monte Carlo experiments. 
Hence, we include an estimate of the bias in the second-stage regression, following the procedure 
described by Simar & Wilson. Specifically, we modify their Algorithm #2 in order to perform an 
input-oriented DEA estimation.22 The details of this procedure are given in the Appendix. 
 
 
3. The data 
 
The data set used in this contribution is composed of information collected directly from a 
sample of 57 European airports for the year 2006. The sample covers all of the largest European 
airports (those classified in category A) and 90% of the so-called large national airports 
(classified in category B). To obtain the needed inputs, for example the number of aircraft 
parking positions or baggage claim lines, we contacted each airport’s management directly. We 
investigated 60 airports, but 3 of them (5%) did not provide the necessary information.  
Following Gillen & Lall (1997) and Pels et al. (2003), we regard airports as the interface 
between airlines and passengers. Hence we need to consider two kinds of activity: Air Transport 
Movements (ATM) and Air Passenger Movements (APM). ATM is both an output (for aircraft 
movements) and an input (for passenger movements).23 This means that we can estimate the 
airport’s efficiency in terms of either ATM (without considering APM) or APM (where ATM is 
treated as an input). 
For each airport we collected information on two output variables: the yearly number of 
aircraft movements (ATM) and the yearly number of passenger movements (APM). To model the 
ATM efficiency frontier, we collected the following inputs: the total surface area of the airport 
(AREA), the total length of its runways (RUNWAYS), and the total number of aircraft parking 
positions (PARKING). Analysis of the APM frontier involves the following inputs: the yearly 
number of aircraft movements (ATM), the terminal surface area (TERMINAL), the number of 
check-in desks (CHECK), the number of the aircraft parking positions (PARKING), and the 
number of baggage claim lines (CLAIM). Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for each of these 
output and input variables over the entire sample. 
                                                 
22
 Their algorithm is designed for output-oriented DEA estimation. 
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[insert Table 1 here] 
 
 
The average number of passengers per airport is about 17 million (considering only 
European airports with more than 5 million passengers per year). The average number of aircraft 
movements is about 188,000. The average airport’s infrastructure includes 136,635 square meters 
of terminal space, 81 aircraft parking positions, 130 check-in desks, and 11 baggage claim lines. 
It covers a surface area of 906 hectares, including 6,471 meters of runways (most airports in the 
sample have multiple runways). 
 
 
4. DEA results 
 
In this section we present the airports’ DEA scores, i.e., their distances from the estimated 
efficiency frontier. The impact of certain variables on these scores, obtained by applying the 
Simar & Wilson approach, is described in the next section. We report efficiency scores based on 
CRS and VRS analysis. The former is obtained by applying the Charnes et al. (1978) model, 
wherein we assume constant returns to scale between inputs and outputs. VRS efficiency scores 
are computed by applying the Banker et al. (1984) model, which assumes variable returns to 
scale and measures only the airports’ technical efficiency (without considering their scale 
efficiency). We complete the section by computing the direction (increasing or decreasing) of 
observed returns to scale in individual airports.24  
Table 2 shows the DEA efficiency scores of European airports in terms of ATM, reporting 
distances from both the CRS and VRS frontiers. There are 11 airports on the VRS frontier (i.e., 
with TE = 1): five (16%) category A airports (London Heathrow, Paris Charles De Gaulle, 
Frankfurt, Dublin, and Manchester), and 6 (23%) category B airports (Larnaca, Milan Linate, 
Faro, Liverpool, London Luton, and Newcastle). The average distance from the VRS frontier 
among those airports with TE < 1 is 0.27 for category A, and 0.30 for category B. Thus, the 
average inefficiency is somewhat greater among national airports. These results imply that large 
                                                                                                                                                              
23
 ATM can be considered an intermediate good produced by the airport and consumed in the production of APM. 
24
 The direction of the returns to scale is obtained by solving the problem shown in expression (1) after substituting 
the constraint 1=′qs for 1≤′qs . If the new estimate of δ  is less than 1 and the new value of θ  is equal to (less 
than) the old value ofθ , then we have Decreasing (Increasing) Returns to Scale. This result is denoted D(I)RS. CRS 
indicates Constant Returns to Scale. 
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European airports are working either at full capacity or close to it, while the national airports 
have capacity to spare.25 
 
[insert Table 2 here] 
 
 
Looking for national differences among the largest countries, we note that in France there is 
only 1 efficient airport (out of 6), and that the other airports’ average distance from the frontier is 
0.43. The same number of efficient airports is reported for Germany (1 out of 9) and Italy (1 out 
of 7), while no efficient airport belongs to Spain. The average distances of inefficient airports 
from the frontier in these countries are 0.31, 0.23, and 0.19 respectively. The UK has the greatest 
number of efficient airports, 5 out of 10, and the average distance from the frontier is equal to 
0.27. We conclude that the first country in Europe to implement both liberalization and incentive 
regulations (based on a price cap) is now reaping the benefits of higher efficiency in airport 
management.  
The very large airports (Heathrow, Paris, Frankfurt, Amsterdam, etc.) exhibit decreasing 
returns to scale, signaling that they would incur lower average costs by decreasing the scale of 
operations. Among category A airports, about two-thirds (20) have increasing returns to scale, 
while 9 have decreasing returns to scale. Only 2 are operating at the optimal scale (Dublin and 
Manchester). Nearly all the category B airports operate at increasing returns to scale (25 out of 
26). Hence, there is evidence that category B airports may benefit from a reduction in average 
costs if they increase their scale of operations, i.e., the volume of aircraft movements. 
The DEA efficiency scores obtained when considering output passengers (APM) are shown 
in Table 3. There are 19 airports on the frontier, of which 13 (43%) belonging to category A and 
6 (22%) to category B. In general, we note that European airports are more efficient with 
passengers than with aircraft.26 The average distance from the efficient frontier among category 
A airports (computed for those airports not on the frontier) is 0.23, while that for category B 
airports is 0.26. Again we see that larger airports are more efficient than national airports, but at 
the same time both types are somewhat closer to technical efficiency than they appear when 
considering only aircraft movements. 
                                                 
25
 As mentioned before when dealing with the VRS model, some caution is necessary in judging the efficiency 
scores reported for the very largest airports (i.e., London Heathrow and Paris Charles De Gaulle). Indeed, under the 
CRS model where these two airports are compared with the entire sample and not just to each other, their efficiency 
is lower. This is especially true for Paris Charles De Gaulle. 
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[insert Table 3 here] 
 
 
If we compare individual countries, Spain now shows the highest relative efficiency: 7 out 
of 8 airports lie on the efficient frontier. This is quite a reversal from the ATM scores, where 
Spain was in the worst position. Italy and the UK each have 3 airports on the frontier (out of 7 
and of 10 respectively), while France and Germany have only one efficient airport each. The 
average distances of inefficient airports from the frontier are as follows: 0.34 for France, 0.30 for 
Germany, 0.20 for Italy and 0.15 for UK. Hence we can fairly say that Spain is the most efficient 
country concerning passengers, while France is the least efficient.  
Looking at the returns to scale, we again find that most of the largest European airports 
exhibit decreasing returns. The important exceptions are London Heathrow, Munich (constant 
returns) and London Gatwick (increasing returns). There are 9 category A airports (out of 31) 
with decreasing returns to scale, 12 with constant returns to scale and 12 with increasing returns 
to scale. Considering airport efficiency in terms of passengers thus yields an interesting result: 
more than one-third of the largest European airports currently enjoy the benefits of operating at 
the lower bound of the average costs curve. An equal number could reduce their average costs in 
dealing with passengers by increasing their scale of operations. Almost all of the European 
category B airports (24 out of 26) have increasing returns to scale; the exceptions are two Spanish 
airports (Alicante and Tenerife) exhibiting constant returns to scale. Hence, the European 
national airports can reduce their average costs by increasing the number of passengers. These 
observations again show that national airports have spare capacity.  
These results point out that a similar number of large airports and almost all of the national 
airports lie far from the efficiency frontier. These installations should first improve the utilization 
of their capacity by increasing their scale of operations (the number of passengers), in order to 
take the advantage of lower average costs. We also observe that it is easier to reach the efficiency 
frontier and an optimal scale by managing passengers rather than aircraft movements. 
Figure 4 shows the efficiency scores of each airport, in terms of both aircraft movements 
and passengers. Only 4 airports lie on both frontiers: Larnaca, Dublin, London Heathrow and 
Manchester. The majority (35) of the remaining 53 airports are more efficient in dealing with 
passengers than with aircraft movements. The least efficient European airports at the moment are 
                                                                                                                                                              
26
 A possible explanation may be a greater degree of input indivisibility when dealing with aircraft movements. 
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located in the middle of the plot: Marseille, Warsaw and Hanover. The correlation between the 
two efficiency scores is positive but rather low (0.53), showing that it is rather difficult to achieve 
efficiency on both counts.  
 
[insert Figure 4 here] 
 
 
To sum up, this analysis has shown that inefficiency tends to be higher in smaller airports. 
This is true for both of the outputs considered in this paper (aircraft movements and passengers). 
This implies that most of the European airports with less than 10 million passengers appear to 
have spare capacity. In general, airports exhibit a greater ability to manage passengers than 
aircraft movements. This difference may be due to an exogenous shock (the robust increase in 
demand for passenger air transportation due to the development of low-cost carriers), to 
regulatory constraints (e.g., time limits in aircraft movements), or to a lack of competition 
between airports in attracting carriers.  
 
6. The determinants of efficiency 
 
We now turn to the main goal of this paper, discovering the impact of network centrality 
and intensity of competition on the efficiency scores of European airports. As mentioned in the 
Introduction, we set out two main hypotheses: (1) the more an airport is “central” to the 
European network, the higher its efficiency, since centrality presumably permits a more intense 
exploitation of the airport’s physical inputs; and (2) the greater the intensity of competition on a 
given airport, the higher its efficiency, since a more competitive environment incites management 
to attract airlines by increasing productivity factors.  
Assuming cross-sectional heteroskedasticity (see Abbott & Wu, 2002), the DEA efficiency 
scores are regressed on a number of exogenous variables covering specific characteristics of the 
airports. As previously described, this regression follows the Simar & Wilson bootstrap 
methodology.27 The two dependent variables are ATMδ  and APMδ , the airports’ distances in 2006 
from the VRS frontiers regarding aircraft movements and passenger movements respectively. We 
consider five explanatory variables: BETWEEN (the adjusted Betweenness connectivity index, 
kβ~ , showing how well the airport is connected with all other European airports), 
                                                 
27
 The bootstrap analysis was performed using a Matlab program. 
 19 
ESSEN_BETWEEN (the degree to which an airport is necessary to reach other territories within 
Europe, i.e. kR ), COMPETITION (the fraction of flights departing from the airport that could be 
replaced by other flights departing from nearby airports and/or arriving at a nearby destination, 
i.e. kIC ), DOMINANCE (a variable reflecting the presence of a dominant carrier, computed as 
the percentage of total ASK supplied by the first carrier in a given airport), and 
MULTI_AIRPORT (a dummy variable, equal to 1 if the management of airport i also controls at 
least one other airport in the sample). We estimate the following model: 
 
iiMAiD
iCiEBiB
h
i
AIRPORTMULTIDOMINANCE
NCOMPETITIOBETWEENESSENBETWEEN
εββ
βββαδ
+⋅+⋅+
+⋅+⋅+⋅+=
_
_
 
 
where hiδ  is the DEA score of airport i for output h ( { }APMATMh ,= ) obtained after applying 
the Simar & Wilson procedure. Table 4 presents summary statistics of the explanatory variables. 
About 35% of the European airports belong to a group, the average index of indirect competition 
is 35.3% (with a high standard deviation), and the airline with the highest market share in the 
representative airport is 35%. On average, a given European airport is part of almost 12,000 
shortest paths connecting origin/destination pairs (Betweenness). However, the vast majority of 
these connections can be performed with the same number of steps by passing through other 
intermediate airports. Only 1.5% of these connections do not have such alternative paths 
(Essential Betweenness).  
 
[insert Table 4 here] 
 
Table 5 displays the correlation matrix among the six input variables (CLAIM, CHECK, 
TERMINAL, PARKING, RUNWAYS and AREA) in its upper rows, and the five Tobit 
regression covariates in its lower rows. The computed correlation is low for all covariates.  
 
[insert Table 5 here] 
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The results of the Simar & Wilson methodology are reported in Table 6. Columns 2-5 of 
Table 6 provide the estimated coefficients and significance levels, then the lower and upper 
bounds of the confidence interval obtained after regressing DEA Technical Efficiency (TE) 
scores on the explanatory variables. This first group refers to efficiency in managing aircraft 
movements. The second group (columns 6-9) is identical, but refers to efficiency in managing 
passengers. Significance levels at 1%, 5% and 10% of the confidence intervals are labeled with 
one, two and three asterisks respectively.  
 
[insert Table 6 here] 
 
The truncated regression seems to fit the data well, with statistically significant t-statistics for all 
parameters (if we consider both ATM and APM) except airline dominance. Thus, both of the 
research hypotheses mentioned above are confirmed in general terms.  
While the number of shortest-path interconnections (BETWEEN) is significant under both 
models (ATM and APM), the quality of being necessary to reach some territories within Europe 
(ESSEN_BETWEEN) is only significant when we consider aircraft movements (ATM).  
Furthermore, efficiency is higher for airports with greater values of BETWEEN, and lower for 
airports with greater values of ESSEN_BETWEEN. The latter result shows that when an airport 
is essential to certain segments of air traffic, it is more difficult to optimize the use of its capacity. 
A possible explanation is that the local economies of these European regions have a low degree 
of attractiveness for the airlines. This, in turn, penalizes the airports that are gateways for these 
regions.  
Efficiency in managing aircraft movements is not significantly influenced by competitive 
pressure from other airports or the dominance of a single carrier. However, increased competition 
does make airports more efficient at managing their passenger traffic. The presence of a 
substitute airport for the same connection probably induces management to reduce fares (or to 
offer better services) so airlines can attract more customers.  Finally, there is evidence that 
managing more than one airport increases the overall efficiency. Since in our sample it is 
generally nearby airports that share management, our finding may be due to the deliberate 
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shifting of passengers toward nearby airports with less congestion; the recent experience of 
London Heathrow and London Gatwick is one example.28 Moreover, operators managing multi-
airport systems can extract gains from specialization, for example by concentrating domestic 
flights in one airport and intercontinental flights in another. A further explanation for the scale 
effect is market power: with more than one airport under its control, the management can reduce 
the airlines’ buyer power and achieve more efficient asset utilization by optimally allocating 
flights among airports. 
 
To sum up, our analysis shows that technical efficiency tends to be higher for both outputs 
considered in this study, among airports that are well connected within the European network. 
This new result should be taken into account by governments and the European Commission 
when dealing with airport development programs and policy. It is also of interest to airport 
managers, who should consider connectivity as one of the driver to improve their efficiency. 
Another interesting result is that efficiency in dealing with passengers is higher among airports 
exposed to some degree of competitive pressure (routes offered by other airports within the same 
catchment areas). Policy makers will find that developing competitive airports is a good way to 
encourage efficiency in their operations. The efficient utilization of inputs dedicated to aircraft 
movements (runways, aircraft parking positions, etc.) is less likely, however, when the airport is 
essential to reaching a particular region within Europe. This fact is probably due to the low 
degree of attractiveness of these regions for the airlines. 
 
6. Conclusions 
 
This paper has investigated the efficiency of 57 large European airports by applying a two-
stage econometric model based on Simar & Wilson’s (2007) bootstrap methodology. The sample 
covers about 95% of European airports serving more than 5 million passengers per year. The 
econometric technique used here is superior in many ways to those usually adopted in the 
literature to estimate airport efficiency. The panel is balanced so that estimation techniques are 
less influenced by heterogeneity. The paper also proposes some indices to measure the centrality 
of an airport within the European network and the intensity of competition exerted by airports 
located in the same catchment area. 
                                                 
28
 During the last decade, British Airways’ response to increased congestion at London Heathrow has been the 
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We find that an airport’s importance in the European network has a positive impact on its 
efficiency. This means that the greater an airport’s contribution to the development of the 
network (and therefore to passenger and freight mobility within the European Union), the more 
complete its utilization of physical assets. We also identify a positive link between the intensity 
of competition and efficient utilization of physical inputs. This correlation implies that 
productivity is higher when the airport cannot operate as a monopolist. When multiple airports 
compete in the same catchment area, it also means that more passengers are traveling to and from 
that region, boosting its economic development. Another interesting insight is the positive impact 
of multi-airport management on airport efficiency. This means that economies of scale and 
learning effects can be exploited when operating with multiple units in the same region. Finally, 
we do not find any evidence that the presence of a dominant airline affects airport efficiency. In 
this we differ from some previous results (e.g. Gillel & Lall, 1997 and Malighetti et al., 2007). 
We have shown that efficiency is also related to airport size: airports with more than 10 
million passengers are more efficient than medium-sized airports with between 5 and 10 million 
passengers. Further development in the activities of large airports may lead to an increase in their 
average costs, since most of these are operating under decreasing returns to scale. In contrast, we 
find evidence for spare capacity in many medium-sized airports operating under increasing 
returns to scale. 
We can infer some policy recommendations from the above evidence. First, the link 
between airport competition and efficiency suggests that air transportation policies should focus 
on increasing the competition within important catchment areas (possibly by investing in 
infrastructure to reduce the access time to alternative airports). A secondary benefit of 
competition is that airport charges regulations are less important when more routes are under 
competition (i.e., when the same origin and destination are available from another airport in the 
same catchment area). 
Second, public policy should provide incentives for airports to develop their role in the 
European network, for instance by subsidizing routes connecting regional airports to the main 
European hubs or new point-to-point connections between airports with spare slots. Third, the 
positive effect of shared management on the efficiency of airport groups suggests that any 
decision to break up airport groups (e.g. the separation of London Heathrow and London Gatwick 
now under discussion) should be considered with care. Finally, the absence of a dominant airline 
                                                                                                                                                              
transfer of flights to London Gatwick. 
 23 
effect on efficiency may indicate that competition within an airport is not a factor limiting airport 
efficiency. All of these suggestions move in the same direction: further development of the EU 
network, and encouraging competition between airports and airlines belonging to the same 
catchment area.   
 
 
 
 
Appendix: The Simar & Wilson bootstrap procedure 
 
The procedure consists of 7 steps, and contains two loops.  
 
Step 1. We compute iδˆ  using DEA.  
Step 2. We apply the maximum likelihood method to obtain the estimates βˆ  and εσˆ  in the 
truncated regression 1ˆ ≤++= iii Za εβδ , using the nm < observations where 1ˆ <iδ .  
Step 3. This loop, performed 1L  times,
29
 obtains a set of bootstrap estimates { } 1 1*ˆ Lbibi ==Γ δ . It 
consists of four substeps: 
3.1. For each i = 1, …, n, we draw iε  from )ˆ,0( εσN ; 
 
3.2. For each i = 1, …, n, we compute iii Z εβδ +=* ; 
3.3. We set 
ii
i
ii
i yy
x
x ==
*
*
*
,
ˆδ
δ
 (for i = 1, …, n); 
3.4. For each i = 1, …, n, we compute *ˆiδ  using DEA but replacing ix  with *ix  and iy  
with *
i
y . 
Step 4. We compute the bias-corrected estimator )ˆ(ˆˆ
ˆ
ˆ
iii B δδδ −=
 ( )ˆ(ˆ iB δ  represents the estimated 
bias) using the bootstrap estimates in iΓ .  
Step 5. We use the maximum likelihood method to estimate 1
ˆ
ˆ ≤++= iii Za εβδ
, yielding 
estimates )ˆˆ,
ˆ
ˆ( σβ
.  
Step 6. This loop, repeated 2L  times, obtains a set of bootstrap estimates { } 2 1** )ˆ,ˆ( Lbb ==Ω εσβ . 
6.1. For each i = 1, …, n, we draw iε  from the )ˆˆ,0( εσN  distribution with left-truncation 
at )ˆˆ1( βiZ− ; 
6.2. For each i = 1, …, n, we compute iii Z εβδ += ˆˆ** ; 
                                                 
29
 Simar & Wilson suggest 1001 =L . In step 6 below, they suggest 20002 =L . 
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6.3. We use the maximum likelihood method to estimate the truncated regression of **iδ  
on iZ , yielding estimates )ˆˆ,ˆˆ( ** σβ . 
Step 7. We use the bootstrap values in Ω  and the original estimates )ˆˆ,
ˆ
ˆ( σβ
 to construct estimated 
confidence intervals for each element of β  and for εσ . For instance, looking at iβ , if the 
distribution of )
ˆ
ˆ( ii ββ −
 were known, it would be easy to find values ),( αα ba  such that 
 
αββ αα −=−≤−≤− 1])ˆˆ(Pr[ ab ii ,                          (2) 
 
e.g. with 05.0=α . However, since the distribution of )ˆˆ( ii ββ −  is unknown, we can use 
the ith element of each bootstrap value *ˆˆβ  to find values ),( ** αα ba  such that  
 
αββ αα −≈−≤−≤− 1])ˆˆˆˆ(Pr[ * ab ii  .                         (3) 
Substituting ),( ** αα ba  for ),( αα ba  in (2) leads to an estimated confidence interval 
]ˆˆ,ˆˆ[ ** αα ββ ba ii ++ . 
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